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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The General Utilities doctrine, named for the 1935 Supreme Court decision1 
allowing a corporation to distribute appreciated assets to shareholders without 
reporting a taxable gain, was once known as one of seven fundamental 
principles of American corporate taxation.2 The doctrine’s popularity reached 
its peak in 1954, when Congress formally incorporated it into the Internal 
Revenue Code.3 Despite this esteemed position among tax-law doctrines, 
General Utilities was routinely criticized because, among other things, it allowed 
a situational (and arbitrary) reprieve from “double taxation” of corporate 
income.4 Corporate income5 is functionally taxed twice in the sense that the 
corporation owes tax on the profits earned by its operations and the 
shareholders owe individual income taxes on the leftover, after-tax profits the 
corporation distributes to shareholders. The General Utilities doctrine reflects a 
tension that has existed throughout tax law history—that is, whether double 
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 1.  General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
 2.  Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and 
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 130 (1977).  
 3.  See Cheryl D. Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 307, 313 n.33 (1984) (arguing that Congress clearly intended to codify General Utilities in the 
1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code).  
 4.  Lily Kahng, Resurrecting the General Utilities Doctrine, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1998).  
 5.  “Corporate” and “corporation” primarily refer to corporations organized under Subchapter C 
or S of the Internal Revenue Code. Subchapter-C corporations will be referred to as “C-corporations.” 
These are types of entities that are incorporated and actually exist apart from their owners. 
Clarifications regarding the nature of incorporated entities vis-à-vis non–incorporated entities will be 
noted as necessary. 
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taxation of corporate income is good policy.6 
Over the years, many scholars and tax experts have expressed the view that 
two-level taxation of certain corporate entities is appropriate, while businesses 
and their tax counsel have routinely lobbied for and devised ways around this 
now-enduring feature of corporate taxation. This tension between a true two-
tax regime and an “integrated” system in which only shareholders are taxed was 
one of the issues at the heart of the debate surrounding repeal of General 
Utilities.7 Proponents of separating corporate and shareholder income see 
General Utilities as arbitrary and unreasonably advantageous for corporations. 
Those who believe that the fictional corporate person should not be taxable 
view General Utilities as a framework to integrate corporate income. General 
Utilities, then, was a blessing to tax attorneys and a predicament for the tax 
collector. 
Both Congress and the Court attempted to balance this longstanding tension 
by formulating, reformulating, and grafting complex exceptions onto the 
doctrine.8 As the doctrine got more complicated, many in the academy became 
convinced that General Utilities was a purely dogmatic convention with no 
logical justification.9 However, those who believed that corporate double 
taxation was not sound policy in every respect saw General Utilities as far from 
unfairly advantageous for corporations.10 There is no explanation in the General 
Utilities case, the Treasury regulations that might be considered the doctrine’s 
origin, or any subsequent act of the Court or Congress why a transaction that 
resembles a sale of an appreciated asset would not trigger tax liability for the 
realized appreciation. On the other hand, the shareholders, and not the 
corporation, were the taxpayers who were formally and literally selling the 
shares. And, moreover, dividends in kind were not traditionally considered 
taxable events for the corporation.11 Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, the clamor 
for reform or repeal of General Utilities had reached a fever pitch, and in 1986 
Congress entombed the formerly glorious precept of American tax law, thus 
extending the principle of double taxation12 and also simplifying the tax 
treatment of distributions of corporate assets. 
 
 
 6.  See generally Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post–World War II Corporate Tax Reform, 
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Winter 2010) (describing the double taxation of corporate income 
through the lens of post–World War II tax-reform efforts, culminating with the dividend provisions in 
the Bush Tax Cuts in 2003).  
 7.  Block, supra note 3, at 333. 
 8.  Id. at 324. 
 9.  Bernard Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of 
the General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 81 (1985).  
 10.  See Richard C.E. Beck, Distributions In Kind in Corporate Liquidations: A Defense of General 
Utilities, 38 TAX LAW. 663, 670 (1985) (arguing that the General Utilities doctrine was not necessarily 
an unfair advantage for corporations). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  David Shores, Repeal of General Utilities and the Triple Taxation of Corporate Income, 46 
TAX L. 177, 177 (1992).  
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It has been over twenty-five years since General Utilities met its end. At the 
time, its repeal was considered, for better or worse, a “sea change” in American 
tax law.13 No longer could liquidating corporations14 distribute assets to 
shareholders and transfer them tax free. In addition, managing tax liabilities on 
various types of assets became simpler: all were taxed.15 In the intervening 
years, most who were originally in favor of the doctrine’s repeal were likely 
untroubled by its absence. A smaller group of scholars and a few tax 
professionals, though, were not so sure.16 Some of the ill effects supposedly 
vanquished by the doctrine’s repeal were replaced with others. It is possible that 
Congress will undertake a major tax reform again in the near future. If it does, 
double taxation of corporate income might well be a significant point of debate. 
At a comfortable distance of a quarter century, a thorough examination of the 
history surrounding General Utilities, the debates at the time of repeal, and the 
policy tensions that underpinned those debates will show that General Utilities’ 
repeal was a major turning point in American tax law history and may provide 
some new insights as policymakers once again consider taking up the mantle of 
tax reform. 
II 
GENERAL UTILITIES’ PLACE IN TAX-LAW HISTORY 
A. The History of Double Taxation of Corporate Income 
One of the more controversial features of the U.S. federal income tax is that 
certain income is taxed at both the corporate level and the shareholder level.17 
For example, suppose a corporation earns a profit of $1,000,000 from its 
operations. As a corporation, a legal entity apart from its owners, it would then 
pay tax on that income, say $300,000.18 This leaves $700,000 in the corporate 
treasury, some of which, say $400,000, it will distribute to its owners as 
dividends. Those dividends, then, are income of the owners who receive them. 
Because the owners are individuals who also pay tax on their income, the 
 
 13.  ROBERT W. WOOD, GENERAL UTILITIES REDUX? M&A TAX REPORT 8 (2009), available at 
http://woodporter.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/General_Utilities_Redux.pdf. 
 14.  Liquidation is functionally the only circumstance in which a corporation could avail itself of 
General Utilities by the time it was repealed. See I.R.C. § 336 (1984) (allowing nonrecognition of gain in 
complete liquidation).  
 15.  However, given the number of relief provisions and other rules for mitigating the troubles 
caused by repeal, some have argued that this issue has become more complicated. See Beck, supra note 
10, at 663 (describing various relief provisions proposed prior to repeal).  
 16.  See, e.g., Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087; Louis F. Lobenhofer, The Repeal of General Utilities 
for Corporate Liquidations — The Consequences of Incomplete and Unexpected Tax Reform, 4 AKRON 
TAX J. 153 (1987).  
 17.  This feature of U.S. tax law is considerably different from other tax systems around the world. 
Bank, supra note 6, at 207. 
 18.  This figure is for illustrative purposes only and does not necessarily reflect what a corporation 
with $1,000,000 of taxable income might currently pay in taxes.  
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money they receive as a dividend must also be taxed.19 Therefore, of the same 
$400,000 in distributed corporate profits, the Internal Revenue Service collects 
a share at the corporation level as a percentage of the corporation’s reported 
income and at the individual level as a percentage of that shareholder’s 
personal income. Hence, what is essentially the same income, in the sense that it 
was really only earned or created once, is taxed two times. 
A tax on income is relatively young in the United States. Congress enacted 
the first permanent tax on corporate and individual income20 in 1894, but the 
scheme was promptly declared unconstitutional.21 Roughly fifteen years later, 
Congress decided to institute an excise tax for doing business as a corporation, 
the size of that excise being a function of the corporation’s income.22 Like the 
difference between selling an asset directly and distributing it to shareholders 
who then subsequently sell it, it is quite difficult to distinguish between an 
excise tax for doing business as a corporation based on income and a corporate 
income tax.23 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decided that such an excise was 
constitutional.24 Although the excise tax was the basis for taxing corporations, 
there was no income tax on individuals in 1909. If there is only one tax on 
corporate income, two-level taxation does not exist unless one corporation 
receives dividends from owning stock in another. Congress was apparently 
cognizant of the problem with this outcome, so it allowed a deduction of other 
corporations’ dividends from the relevant corporation’s excise calculation to 
ensure that a corporation’s income would not be taxed twice.25 In 1913, 
Congress passed and the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, which 
overrode the Supreme Court’s declaration that an income tax was 
unconstitutional. Since then, Congress has had constitutional authority to tax 
the incomes of both corporations and individuals.26 
At first, both corporate income-tax rates and individual rates were 1% on all 
income under $20,000.27 Individuals, and not corporations, whose income 
 
 19.  Currently, dividend income is treated separately from ordinary wage income, but that has not 
always been the case. Prior to 2003, dividend income was ordinary income and will be again if the Bush 
Tax Cuts are not extended. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-27, §§ 302–303, 117 Stat. 752, 760–64 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.).  
 20.  During the Civil War, Congress authorized an income tax to fund war efforts but allowed it to 
expire in 1872. See Gary Giroux, Financing the American Civil War: Developing New Tax Sources, 17 
ACCT. HISTORY 83 (2012). 
21. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Shores, supra note 12, at 186. 
 22.  Shores, supra note 12, at 187–88.  
 23.  Id. at 188.  
 24.  Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).  
 25.  Shores, supra note 12, at 188.  
 26.  U.S. Const. amend. XVI.  
 27.  Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, §2A(1) 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). This is roughly 
$450,000 in 2010 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index as the rate of inflation. See CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2014) (enter 20000 in “$” field; then select 1913 as the base year and 2010 as the equivalent 
year). 
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exceeded $20,000 were required to pay a graduated tax of 2%–6% on any 
income above $20,000.28 And, just like it had prevented double taxation for 
corporations who received the dividends of other corporations, Congress 
exempted dividend income from the net-income calculation.29 There was one 
exception: Those individuals whose total incomes were subject to the graduated 
tax were required to pay taxes on those dividends that exceeded $20,000.30 The 
reason for this was simple: an individual whose business activities would earn in 
excess of $20,000 could incorporate him or herself as a C-corporation, pay 1% 
of the corporation’s income in taxes and take all of the remaining income in tax-
free dividends. Thus, the double tax on corporate income was designed to deter 
taxpayers from opportunistically and arbitrarily avoiding substantial tax solely 
by choosing to operate as a corporation.31 
Nonetheless, many prominent tax scholars have described the General 
Utilities doctrine, a reprieve from double taxation, as dogmatic.32 They argue 
that it makes no sense in light of the “classical, double tax” on corporate 
income.33 As the twentieth century marched on, scholars and others began to 
accept the double tax as a permanent feature of the tax code, despite the fact 
that the early Congresses who confronted double taxation seemed to disfavor 
it.34 The justification for the double tax was relatively simple: Because 
corporations are legally “people,”35 they are taxed separately from actual 
people.36 Viewed this way, it appears that a tax on all income without regard to 
source could provide for double, triple, or even further multiplied taxation.37 
 
 28.  Id. at 166–67.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 9, at 81 (describing the General Utilities doctrine as 
“theological[] . . . like creation, it was there.”).  
 33.  Id. at 86; see also Shores, supra note 12, at 186 n.34 (citing ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, REPORTER’S STUDY OF THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 
327 (1982)).  
 34.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 177 n.60 (citing ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra 
note 33, at 327 (describing and defending the contemporary understanding of double taxation)). 
 35.  The notion of corporate personhood dates back to the mid-1800s. The Supreme Court ruled in 
an obscure case, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R., Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), that corporations 
were individuals for certain purposes. It arose out of a tax dispute between a California county and a 
railroad corporation. Individuals were allowed a certain tax deduction by the county, while 
corporations were not. The Supreme Court sided with the railroad corporation, deciding that for these 
purposes, corporations had the same rights as individuals. The Court’s controversial 2010 decision in 
Citizens’ United v. Federal Election Commission seemed to firmly cement corporate personhood as the 
Court decided that corporations have First Amendment rights to free speech. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 36.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 185–86 (describing the entity theory of corporate law).  
 37.  Cf. id. To illustrate the multiple-tax principle, imagine a corporation, call it Bitterman. 
Bitterman owns stock in another corporation, Acme. Acme distributes some of its income as dividends 
to shareholders, including Bitterman. Bitterman earns income, including the dividends from Acme, and 
then distributes dividends of its own. Acme is taxed on income it earns, then Bitterman is taxed on the 
dividends it earned from Acme stock, and Bitterman shareholders are taxed on dividends distributed 
by Bitterman. Therefore, part of the income has been taxed at three levels, unless Congress provides 
that dividends are deductible at some level.  
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Furthermore, many corporations are large and have vast numbers of individual 
and institutional shareholders, making the corporation seem even more distinct 
from the random and varied individuals who own it. Certainly, from a revenue-
collection standpoint, the more opportunities (or entities) from which taxes may 
be extracted, the more potential revenue fills the nation’s coffers. Only 
lawmakers, then, could decide whether and at what levels dividends could be 
exempted from taxation, and therefore how many levels at which certain 
earnings are taxed. The first Congress faced with the prospect of double 
taxation apparently felt that this was not appropriate and exempted dividends 
from other income earned by taxpayers. Further, just six years after the 
constitutional birth of the income tax, Treasury regulations were promulgated 
making the distribution of dividends and dividends in kind non–taxable events.38 
Surely, those regulations were on the Court’s mind when it decided General 
Utilities. 
B. General Utilities Co. v. Helvering 
More than fifteen years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in General 
Utilities, but only six years after the birth of the income tax, the Treasury 
introduced regulations that essentially declared that various dividend 
transactions would not be taxable.39 The treatment of dividend transactions has 
always been a struggle for policymakers because there is no easy way to classify 
dividends for tax purposes. They are not expenses paid that might be deducted 
from income, nor are they expenses on debts owed to creditors. They are simply 
an internal transaction in which a corporation releases capital directly into the 
hands of shareholders rather than holding it for use within the operations of the 
corporation. Either way, the shareholders are still ultimately entitled to the 
capital. 
General Utilities is a beguilingly simple case. At the time of the events that 
gave rise to the case, the General Utilities Corporation owned half of the 
outstanding stock of Islands Edison, which it had acquired for the paltry sum of 
approximately $2000.40 By the time a buyer approached General Utilities about 
purchasing its share of Islands Edison, the market value of the stock had 
appreciated to more than $1.2 million.41 From an economic perspective, General 
Utilities and the buyer interested in Island Edison could have arranged this 
transaction in any number of ways and achieved the ultimate result of the buyer 
taking control of Islands Edison by purchasing its stock. But taxes are always 
and forever part of any transaction’s economic picture. If General Utilities had 
simply sold the stock to the buyer, it would have faced a massive capital-gains 
tax liability42 for the appreciation of the Islands Edison stock from $2000 to $1.2 
 
 38.  See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 39.22 (a)–20 (1953). 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 201 (1935).  
 41.  Id. at 202. 
 42.  Capital gains refers to the recognition of income from the dispostion of certain types of assets 
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million. 
Thus, General Utilities arranged the transaction by distributing the stock as 
a dividend in kind.43 In doing so, General Utilities shareholders would owe 
individual income taxes on the value they received from the corporation as a 
dividend, which was the market value of their portion of the distributed stock at 
the time of the distribution. A fundamental principle of both tax and accounting 
is that whenever any entity acquires an asset, the asset must be recorded at the 
price paid or fair market value. This value is called its “basis” for tax purposes. 
In the case of a dividend in kind, the basis of the property distributed as a 
dividend is “stepped up” to fair market value at the time of the distribution. 
Therefore, the stepped-up basis of the Islands Edison stock resulting from the 
dividend distribution eliminated the massive taxable capital gain that would 
have been attributed to General Utilities.44 Given the way this transaction was 
structured, General Utilities had avoided taxation on the capital gain allocable 
to the Islands’ Edison stock, though the shareholders still had to pay taxes on 
the stock they received. However, they did not pay tax on the subsequent sale. 
If General Utilities had sold the stock, it would have owed taxes on the gain. 
Then, if it distributed any of the cash from the sale, the shareholders would owe 
taxes on whatever they received as well. 
Following the transaction, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue 
Service brought an action in tax court against General Utilities to recover the 
tax that would have been owed on the appreciation of the Islands Edison 
stock.45 The commissioner’s only argument in the tax court was that 
distributions in kind are taxable as gains to the distributing corporation.46 The 
Treasury itself disfavored this view, at least in the context of liquidation.47 
However, General Utilities was not liquidating at the time it divested itself of 
Islands Edison. The commissioner failed to make the argument that would 
serve as a centerpiece to the arguments for repeal and that would later be 
accepted by the Court in another case:48 that an arranged, postdistribution sale 
of an appreciated asset by a corporation’s shareholders is functionally a sale by 
the corporation, on which the corporation should pay taxes.49 Indeed, the court 
of appeals sided with the commissioner against General Utilities on this very 
 
that is treated differently from the recognition of general income under § 61 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  
 43.  “In kind” simply means that the dividend is paid in some form other than cash. In this case, the 
dividend was in the form of Islands Edison stock certificates. Distribution of dividends in kind in 
liquidation was not considered a taxable event. Therefore any appreciation on the property distributed 
was not taxable.  
 44.  General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 202.  
 45.  Id. at 200.  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82 n.3 (describing the early Treasury regulations that set forth 
the nontaxability of in-kind dividends). 
 48.  Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); see infra Part II.C.  
 49.  General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.  
2 EDWARDS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:37 AM 
374 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:367 
ground.50 However, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue because of the 
commissioner’s failure to raise it below.51 Although many repeal advocates 
could forgive the Supreme Court for allowing a corporation to avoid taxes in 
circumstances in which it simply distributed the property to shareholders as 
dividends without directing them to immediately sell the property, they could 
see no justification for the Court’s decision to allow General Utilities to avoid a 
tax simply by distributing the asset first and then selling it.52 
As will become clear, General Utilities itself was not actually an application 
of the doctrine that existed at the time of its repeal in 1986. General Utilities 
was not liquidating. Rather, it was simply ridding itself of a single asset.53 Only 
liquidating corporations were ultimately allowed to avail themselves of tax-free 
distribution-then-sale of appreciated assets.54 
C. The Supreme Court’s Subsequent Refinement of General Utilities 
In what would seem like an about-face, the Supreme Court decided 
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.55 a mere ten years after General Utilities. 
Similar to the circumstances in General Utilities, Court Holding owned an 
appreciated asset that it wished to sell.56 The corporation, though, began 
negotiations and agreed in principle to a sale of the asset.57 At the eleventh 
hour, the corporation’s attorney advised its manager–shareholders that the 
corporation would incur a significant capital-gains tax liability if the sale went 
forward as planned.58  As a result, the corporation immediately distributed the 
asset to its two shareholders in kind, who made the sale on practically identical 
terms.59 The Supreme Court found that the corporation obviously contracted to 
make the sale, despite the midnight formalism that the shareholders carried out 
to avoid the tax liability on the appreciation of the asset.60 The head- and chin-
scratching began anew since it seemed as though General Utilities and Court 
Holding were practically identical fact situations but had widely divergent 
outcomes. In fact, the Court even announced a test for this very situation: The 
determination of whether a corporation should be taxed should be decided 
based upon “substance” of the transaction.61 At the time Court Holding was 
 
 50.  Helvering v. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co., 74 F.2d 972, 976 (4th Cir. 1935). 
 51.  General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.  
 52.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82 (describing the grounds that were ultimately upheld in Court 
Holding as “out-of-bounds” and criticizing that result).  
 53.  General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 202.  
 54.  See infra Part II.D; supra note 35.  
 55.  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 331 (1945). 
 56.  Id. at 333. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 334. 
 61.  Id.  
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decided, this test seemed at least generally reasonable62 and balanced the 
concerns many had about allowing these distribution-then-sales to occur to 
avoid corporate-level tax. It might be that the Court was already turning against 
General Utilities, or it could simply have been that the Court in General Utilities 
did not reach the question of whether the structured distribution-then-sale of 
appreciated assets would be taxable to the corporation. 
Five years after Court Holding, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner 
v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,63 whose facts were somewhat different than 
the prior cases. The Cumberland Public Service Company was liquidating itself64 
and wanted to sell various assets to a competitor.65 The competitor apparently 
refused to purchase the assets directly from the company. Therefore, as a part 
of winding up its operations, it distributed the assets to its shareholders as 
dividends in kind.66 The shareholders then sold the assets to the competitor.67 
The facts of Cumberland would seem to place it right in the ambiguity that 
reigned after Court Holding. The Supreme Court, applying the Court Holding 
test, decided that when the corporation could not have made the sale at all, the 
distribution-and-sale of the assets would not be taxable to the corporation.68 
After Cumberland, there was no obvious conclusion as to exactly how various 
corporate distributions should be treated for tax purposes. Under General 
Utilities, it seemed that a distribution-then-sale would be tax free, but under 
Court Holding, such a transaction would be taxed.69 And, of course, the 
economic-substance-of-the-transaction test seemingly announced in Court 
Holding added little clarification. Cumberland’s reasoning was straightforward, 
but the situation seemed very specific: The corporation would only be allowed 
to effect a distribution-then-sale tax free when it simply could not sell the assets 
on its own.70 Further, Cumberland created even more tension in the doctrine by 
raising the question of whether the Supreme Court in Cumberland was blessing 
General Utilities in the liquidation context but not in other contexts or whether 
it had simply applied the test it announced in Court Holding.71 It was not until 
almost ten years later that Congress acted to sort out how it wanted to tax 
 
 62.  Indeed, one commentator argued that focusing on the Court Holding test would be preferable 
to repealing the doctrine altogether. Beck, supra note 10, at 670. 
 63.  Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).  
 64.  Essentially, Cumberland was selling all of its assets and ceasing to operate as a corporation. 
This is the context in which Congress ultimately decided that General Utilities was most useful to 
businesses. I.R.C. § 336 (1954).  
 65.  Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 452–53.  
 66.  Id. at 453.  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 453–54. 
 69.  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 331 (1945); General 
Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 200 (1935).  
 70.  Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 451.  
 71.  See Kahng, supra note 4, at 1089 (describing the disparate holdings of Cumberland and Court 
Holding as a tension in the doctrine). 
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corporate distributions of appreciated assets.72 
D. Codification and Limitation of the Doctrine by Congress 
In 1954, Congress sought to clear up the confusion about the tax effects of 
various types of corporate distributions.73 As scholars have noted, most believed 
that Congress would do away with General Utilities or codify it.74 In codifying 
the doctrine, though, Congress apparently decided that the scope of General 
Utilities should be even greater than the Court found in Court Holding. The sale 
of any appreciated assets, not just those distributed and then sold, to any party 
within a year of a company’s complete liquidation would avoid taxation at the 
corporate level.75 In essence, the holding of Cumberland was extended to 
include all situations in which a company was liquidated, not just situations in 
which the buyer would not accept sale from the liquidating corporation.76 The 
end result of Congress’s codification was to allow corporations to avoid taxation 
on an asset’s appreciation via a distribution to and sale by shareholders or 
simply any sale within a year in this liquidation context.77 
Nonetheless, Congress apparently did not intend for corporations who were 
not winding down their operations to take advantage of the General Utilities 
doctrine.78 Such was the basis of the tension that one early commentator called 
the “central distortion” of tax law.79 Congress apparently believed that in the 
context of liquidation—when a company distributed all remaining cash 
including cash resulting from the sale of appreciated assets—there would always 
be a receiving shareholder to tax.80 Indeed, in every circumstance of corporate 
distribution of assets, there was always a shareholder who was taxed on the 
increase in wealth resulting from the distribution, whether in-kind or in cash. 
Further, Congress apparently perceived a certain wisdom to allowing 
corporations to structure liquidations this way.81 Indeed, liquidation is an 
“extraordinary” event in the life of a corporation.82 It is the point at which the 
distinction between the corporation and its owners is least visible. At the very 
moment the corporation ceases to exist, all remaining cash from the sales of its 
assets is distributed to the corporation’s owners. Nonetheless, many scholars 
and politicians persistently believed that double taxation was necessary. 
 
 72.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 179 (describing Congress’s decision to codify General Utilities in 
1954). 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82.  
 75.  I.R.C. § 336 (1954).  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  The codification only allowed the General Utilities–style distribution-and-sale or any sale to be 
affected tax free as a part of a plan for “full liquidation” of the company. Id.  
 79.  Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82. 
 80.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 179 n.16 (explaining that if the company is in liquidation, the 
distributed assets will “become subject to a shareholder-level tax”). 
 81.  WOOD, supra note 13, at 8. 
 82.  Shores, supra note 12, at 208. 
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 A brief example can illustrate how the postcodification doctrine functioned. 
Suppose a corporation, Enterprise, Inc., purchased 100 shares of Consolidated, 
Inc. in 2002 for $10,000. The CEO perused Consolidated’s financial statements, 
but did not do that much work in assessing the risk. The board of directors did 
not pay attention because it was a small sum of money and because the board 
generally deferred to management. In the financial crisis of 2008, Consolidated 
made a fortune by buying credit default swaps and its stock has been on the rise 
ever since. Its market price is now $1,000,000. The CEO wants to sell the stock, 
but realizes that Enterprise would realize a $990,000 gain on the sale of the 
asset. Under the codified General Utilities doctrine, it would not matter whether 
the CEO sold the stock on the open market or distributed the stock to the 
shareholders with arrangements for them to sell it instead. Enterprise would 
owe taxes on the gain. However, if Enterprise found itself in liquidation, it 
could sell the stock (with all kinds of assets) within one year and avoid the taxes 
on the $990,000 increase over the value it paid. 
With this in mind, it seems arbitrary to tax in one circumstance while not 
taxing in another. The same stock with the same appreciation in value is taxed 
twice if Enterprise remains a going concern but is only taxed once if it 
liquidates. On the other hand, at the point when the corporation is liquidating 
and the shareholders are set to receive whatever cash is left over after all the 
assets are sold and creditors are paid, the tax the corporation must pay with its 
last breath is really paid by the stockholders, not the now-dissolved corporation. 
III 
THE DEBATE SURROUNDING REPEAL 
A. The Rest of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The Tax Reform Act of 198683 was the most recent major overhaul of the 
American system of income taxation. Despite significant complexity, the Act 
was primarily concerned with reducing individual income-tax rates, broadening 
the income-tax base, and eliminating some of the more peculiar (and sometimes 
nonsensical) tax contraptions of the twentieth century.84 To many scholars and 
tax reformers, General Utilities fell into this third category.85 Congress wanted to 
remove many of these provisions because they created unnecessary complexity 
in the Code and because they led to arbitrarily constructed and tax-driven 
transactions that resulted in special advantages for sophisticated businesses with 
 
 83.  Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 84.  For example, throughout the 1900s, individual income taxes were as high as ninety-one percent 
on the highest income earners. With such incredibly high marginal rates, taxpayer unrest was always 
assuaged with numerous loopholes, deductions, and various methods for avoiding some of the Code’s 
highest historical rates.  
 85.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (describing one of the driving forces behind repeal, the ALI 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 33, as a “simplifying and elegant reform” that would 
bring “coherence” to the tax code).   
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expensive tax counsel.86 Given this landscape, it was not surprising that General 
Utilities found its way to the chopping block. Scholars87 and politicians88 lined up 
to express their displeasure with General Utilties’ contribution to the Code’s 
complexity and to its seemingly arbitrary reprieve from the “classical”89 double-
tax system. Furthermore, General Utilities was decidedly on the wrong side of 
the goal of broadening the tax base.90 
There was one peculiarity to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with respect to 
corporate taxation: The reduction in personal income taxes resulted in, for the 
first time in history, lower personal income-tax rates than corporate income-tax 
rates.91 For all those who saw General Utilities as an affront against the 
traditional system of double taxation, a corporate tax rate higher than the 
individual rate would make no difference: they believed both individuals and 
corporations should be taxed either way.92 Strangely, given the historical 
justification of the double tax, a corporate rate higher than the personal one 
would eliminate that justification.93  There was no longer a distinct tax 
advantage to operating as a C-corporation vis-a-vis operating as a 
proprietorship, partnership, or some other type of pass-through corporate 
entity.94 
B. Double Taxation or Integration? 
As previously discussed, the double-tax system had clearly taken root in 
American corporate tax law during the twentieth century. However, over time 
there were always a few who thought that corporations should not be taxed at 
all.95 At the time of the tax reform in 1986, these people were known as 
“integrationists.”96 President Reagan himself seemed to be an integrationist, 
 
 86.  Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 168.  
 87.  See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 9, at 81 (questioning why the doctrine existed).  
 88.  See Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 169 (summarizing some of the legislative history surrounding 
repeal).  
 89.  Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86.  
 90.  Block, supra note 3, at 308.  
 91.  Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 92.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (describing the double taxation of corporate income as 
“classical”). 
 93.  Shores, supra note 12, at 190.  
 94.  Small and medium-sized businesses that do not plan to seek capital investment through access 
to public capital markets may organize as entities that have the same limited liability as corporations 
but are relieved of the double tax by “passing income through” the entity to its shareholders, usually 
limited to a certain number.  
 95.  See Anthony Polito, Constructive Dividend Doctrine from an Integrationist Perspective, 27 
AKRON TAX J. 1, 2 (2012) (describing the term integrationist and the “Integrationist Norm,” which is 
that corporate income should only be taxed once).  
 96.  This is because they believed that the tax framework for individual people should be 
“integrated” with the tax framework for corporations. Corporations are nothing but a group of people 
operating in a different form, so the integrationists believed that practically all corporations should be 
pass-through entities.  
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stating that he saw little justification for any tax on corporations and that taxes 
for corporate income should simply fall to the shareholders when they received 
income from their ownership stake.97 Nonetheless, scholars suggested that even 
integrationists should agree that the system under General Utilities represented 
a partially integrated system, and that those who could benefit from the partial 
integration was simply the result of how well their counsel could splice together 
General Utilities with other doctrines to avoid tax.98 
C. Academic Criticism of General Utilities 
The primary academic criticism of General Utilities is that it seems to be an 
arbitrary and dogmatic tax break for corporations.99 After all, an ordinary 
distribution of an appreciated asset would be required to be reported as a gain, 
while the same gain would not be reported in liquidation.100 Beyond this 
superficial complaint that the doctrine was arbitrary, the doctrine troubled 
scholars because it was a way for corporations to avoid double taxation, which 
had come to be accepted as a permanent feature of income taxation, and 
because it led to what many saw as an above-optimal level of acquisitions.101 
Tax scholars of the 1980s no longer saw double taxation as a proposition to 
prevent opportunistic taxpayers from paying a lower tax simply by virtue of 
operating as a corporation. They saw double taxation as the “classical” system 
for taxation of corporations and their shareholders.102 In effect, repealing 
General Utilities was, to these scholars, the choice to operate a double-tax 
system between corporations and shareholders, rather than one of single tax. 
Simply put, they found it unfair that a corporation in liquidation could escape 
paying taxes on sales and distributions of appreciated property while 
corporations continuing to operate could not.103 
Another major academic complaint about General Utilities was the 
economic effects of allowing liquidating corporations to avoid payment of taxes 
on distributions of assets while disallowing going concerns the same 
opportunity.104 As has been noted, there are a number of ways that a 
corporation wishing to buy another may effect such a transaction.105 For the 
sake of simplicity, the acquiring corporation may simply buy the stock of the 
target corporation and exert control over the assets that way, or it may arrange 
the transaction so that the target corporation liquidates itself and then sells all 
 
 97.  See Block, supra note 3, at 308, n.8 (citing Corporate Tax Upsets Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
1982, at D1, col. 3) (describing Reagan’s criticism of the tax system). 
 98.  Wolfman, supra note 9, at 85–86.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  I.R.C. § 336 (2006).  
 101.  See Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087 (explaining the concern among many about how much 
acquisition activity was occurring in the 1980s).  
 102.  See, e.g.,Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86.  
 103.  Id. at 85. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See supra Part II.B.  
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the assets to the acquiring corporation. Under the General Utilities doctrine, an 
acquiring corporation who purchased control of the target corporation via 
purchasing stock would now own the appreciated assets.106 If, however, the 
acquiring corporation used the second option, it could effect a step up of the 
asset basis to its fair market value much more simply.107 If an asset was stepped 
up every time it moved out of one corporation and into another, no corporation 
would ever have to pay taxes on the gain. This ultimately made appreciated 
assets more valuable to an acquirer than they were to the going concern that 
was currently operating them, thus increasing merger and takeover activity.108 
More disconcerting to the academic proponents of General Utilities’ repeal was 
that the second scenario could occur perpetually as long as the doctrine held 
sway.109 Every time an asset was stepped up, the government lost the 
opportunity to tax the accumulated gain at the corporate level.110 In addition to 
a general belief that General Utilities was dissonant with double taxation of 
corporate income, the perception that General Utilities was contributing to an 
abnormally high level of takeovers led many to believe General Utilities repeal 
should be a piece of tax reform in 1986.111 
D. Congressional Reports 
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 tracks the academic 
arguments in favor of repeal rather closely. The staff of the Senate Finance 
Committee generated a report that concluded that corporations are getting an 
unreasonably favorable deal by being able to perpetually step up asset values 
under General Utilities and that the general goals of the corporate income tax 
were not being served by allowing General Utilities nonrecognition.112 
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the proposed 
legislation also echoed the academy’s concerns about the apparently perverse 
incentive for acquiring corporations to liquidate target corporations to avoid tax 
 
 106.  Under another doctrine, known as the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, acquiring companies could 
step up the assets to fair market value regardless of whether they purchased the stock or the assets 
directly. However, if the assets were purchased directly, the seller would owe taxes on the built in gain 
unless it could avail itself of General Utilities. If it purchased the stock, the stock would reflect the 
increased value of the assets and therefore would result in higher taxes for shareholders. Scholars did 
not particularly like this doctrine either, but its combination with General Utilities was especially 
deplorable because it allowed corporations to effectively avoid ever paying taxes on asset 
appreciations. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 84.  
 107.  In essence, the price of the stock of the target corporation would be more expensive if tax was 
required on the appreciation. This led to an incentive to liquidate with General Utilities rather than 
simply buy the stock and use the step up provided under Kimbell-Diamond.  
 108.  Kahng, supra note 4, at 1092.  
 109.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (explaining that “dead” corporations have effectively avoided 
tax for their entire lives). 
 110.  Id. Furthermore, when you factor in Kimbell-Diamond step ups, an asset may go through its 
life without ever being taxed. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 85 (discussing how corporations can avoid 
tax when assets are at a stepped-up basis).  
 111.  Kahng, supra note 4, at 1093.  
 112.  See Beck, supra note 10, at 678–79 (describing the report of the Senate Finance Committee). 
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through General Utilities.113  The committee thought it was important “that the 
Code should not artificially encourage corporate liquidations and acquisitions” 
and that “repeal of . . . General Utilities . . . is a major step” towards slowing 
down the merger activity of the 1980s.114 Like many scholars, the Ways and 
Means Committee was concerned that General Utilities “undermine[d] the 
corporate income tax.”115 The Committee noted the same concern that 
corporations could step up the basis of acquired assets through a General 
Utilities sale and perpetually avoid recognition of accumulated gains on various 
assets.116 Notably absent from the committee report is an explicit declaration 
that General Utilities is a natural enemy of the double tax. Though limiting 
takeover activity was apparently a normative goal for Congress and it appeared 
to believe that the perpetual step up in gain was an improper gratuity to 
corporations, it did not explain its rationale for the latter conclusion.117  Despite 
Congress’s conclusive stance and the practically unanimous academic chorus of 
repeal,118 some voices in the wilderness urged Congress to think twice. 
E. In Defense of General Utilities 
Most of the defenses of General Utilities around the time of its repeal were 
rooted in path dependence.119 Repealing General Utilities would result in a 
“shock wave,” noted one commentator.120 By 1984, two things were clear to 
most defenders of General Utilities: first, it probably would be repealed and 
second, there would need to be a number of relief provisions and other various 
workarounds to mitigate some of the repeal’s negative consequences.121 
Both the Senate Finance Committee in 1984 and the House Ways and 
Means Committee in 1985 had apparently decided that repeal of General 
Utilities was a favorable and proper course of action. However, the underlying 
rationale for their recommendations seemed shaky at best and theoretically 
untenable at worst.122 Although many arguments in favor of retaining General 
Utilities acknowledged Congress’s queasiness with respect to acquisitions as an 
underlying reason for repeal,123 they generally suggest that the cure would be 
worse than the disease.124 
 
 113.  H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 281–82 (1985). 
 114.  Id. at 282. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Beck, supra note 10, at 667. 
 119.  See Block, supra note 3, at 308 (explaining that given the many years that General Utilities has 
been a major fixture in the corporate tax landscape, there would be some “discomfort” among the tax 
bar with its repeal). 
 120.  Id. at 309.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See Beck, supra note 10, at 663 (stating that the proposals for repeal would create more 
problems).  
 123.  Block, supra note 3, at 324. 
 124.  Beck, supra note 10, at 663–64.  
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In the first place, arguing that General Utilities was unfairly generous to 
corporations necessarily implies that a tax on a corporation’s shareholders 
exclusively, rather than a tax on both, is fundamentally “overgenerous.”125 
However, there is very little traditional justification for a true double tax.126 The 
early Treasury regulations did not consider in-kind distributions as realization 
events, and ample legislative and other administrative history shows that, as a 
general proposition, simply moving assets in and out of the corporate form is 
not something that the income tax is supposed to touch.127 In essence, it appears 
that the academic arguments for repeal flowed only from a value judgment that 
taxing practically every transaction involving a corporation twice is appropriate. 
Furthermore, history tends to fall on the side of taxation at only one level.128 
Double taxation is a later tax innovation that was grafted upon a system never 
built to handle it.129 
As a practical matter, repealing General Utilities seems even more 
problematic. The crux of the arguments against repeal was the nature of 
circumstances130 in which assets moved in and out of the corporate form.131 The 
scholars were clearly contemplating situations in which new ownership was 
using General Utilities to circumvent taxes on gains that occurred under old 
ownership of any given set of assets.132 However, many occurrences involve 
assets moving in and out of various corporate forms by the same owners.133 In 
those circumstances, a person simply moving an asset out of the corporate form 
will have to pay a tax on any appreciation that occurs while the asset lived 
under a corporate form rather than a pass-through form. Such a “toll” for 
moving your own asset in and out of a corporation is problematic.134 The 
fundamental basis of any economic argument for General Utilities was that it did 
not let the Tax Code get in the way of the goal of lining up assets with their 
most efficient uses. If there are awkward tax barriers between various forms, 
this goal is harmed.135 Surely, those making this argument were making an 
implied or subconscious distinction between the different types of enterprises 
 
 125.  Id. at 669.  
 126.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 177 (stating that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the 
justification for double taxation).  
 127.  Beck, supra note 10, at 672–73 (1985).  
 128.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the integrationists and proponents of double tax).  
 129.  See Shores, supra note 12, at 189–90 (explaining that the double tax was not originally intended 
to be as broad as it is currently).  
 130.  These circumstances did not always include transactions, which are considered bargained-for 
agreements for transfer of property between two unrelated parties. These situations are usually thought 
of as taxable circumstances since there are two unrelated parties. However, oftentimes the same owners 
would be changing their holdings from assets themselves to stock in a corporation that held those 
assets, and vice versa.  
 131.  Beck, supra note 10, at 672–73. 
 132.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 84 (discussing “purchasers” who used General Utilities to avoid 
tax on later sales of the same assets to other parties). 
 133.  Beck, supra note 10, at 673.  
 134.  Id. at 674. 
 135.  Id. at 673. 
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that operated as separately-taxable C-corporations. Some corporations are 
large, have operations throughout the world, employ thousands of people, and 
have thousands of diverse shareholders who are truly disconnected from the 
operation of the business. This is the circumstance where the fictional corporate 
person seems the most real or separately alive. However, there were many C-
corporations that were owned by one, two, or twenty people, many of whom 
were involved in or close to the operation of the corporation. In this case, the 
fictional corporate form seems much less distinct from these owners. These 
people tended to move assets in and out of the corporate form or even change 
operating form altogether. The justification for taxing both the corporate body 
and the shareholders that represent its backbone is much weaker for these 
closely held C-corporations. 
The liquidation context, in particular, is one in which the double tax can 
sting all the more painfully. The earlier example of Enterprise, Inc. can serve to 
illustrate this.  Enterprise has shareholders who own rights to the corporation’s 
assets through stock. Say the CEO has haphazardly managed the company and 
run it into the ground. The company will have to liquidate and will cease to 
exist in the corporate form. Nonetheless, it has valuable assets, such as its stock 
in Consolidated, Inc. Under a non–General Utilities regime, the corporation 
would have to pay taxes on all the gains that occurred while the assets existed in 
corporate form, right before the corporation ceased to exist. Functionally, 
though, the tax that the corporation owed would ultimately be borne by the 
shareholders, generally by a lower amount of distribution to them after the 
liquidation.136 This is not just a double tax, one on the corporation and one on 
the shareholders, but rather a double tax on the shareholders by themselves. 
The corporation that technically held the assets while they appreciated is no 
longer alive. Yet, without General Utilities, it is forced to pay taxes. Of course, 
one prominent scholar would respond to these voices in the wilderness by 
imploring you not to pity the poor, dead corporation, because it probably spent 
its life . . . avoiding taxes.137 
IV 
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF REPEAL AND CALLS FOR REINSTATEMENT 
A. Effects on Taxpayers 
Although by now most taxpayers have adjusted their strategies to account 
for the repeal of General Utilities, the short term was more difficult. As argued 
prior to repeal, those hardest hit were small businesses whose owners placed 
 
 136.  See Beck, supra note 10, at 674 (“As soon as the tax is measured, it will fall upon the 
shareholders either as a reduction of their liquidation proceeds or as their direct obligation.”).  
 137.  See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (“[T]he decedent corporation is one that managed quite 
successfully to maneuver through its corporate existence without paying tax on real income that 
accrued during its ownership of the appreciating assets.”). 
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their assets in the corporate form for many years prior to liquidation.138  In 
addition to making liquidation more costly, and thereby deterring those who 
scholars might have wished to prevent from availing themselves of General 
Utilities, the repeal also caught many small businesses in the process.139 Even 
more telling is that big, sophisticated corporations were not the ones most 
acutely affected.140 Large corporations are rarely in liquidation and they can 
avoid gains during acquisitions using other tools and tax provisions aside from 
General Utilities.141 Smaller corporations, though, are less immune to changing 
business cycles and other social problems.142 Owners of small corporations are 
more likely to be very few in number and to move their assets in and out of the 
corporate form from time to time. Given the new tax on moving assets around 
in this way, it would follow logically that smaller corporations would be 
disproportionately hit.143 Furthermore, for those who had the misfortune of 
being a C-corporation before General Utilities repeal and who later wished to 
re-form as a different type of entity, they would owe taxes on long-term 
appreciation of their assets, while an enterprise re-forming itself from one type 
of noncorporation to another will not.144  This tends to “trap” assets in corporate 
forms where they may not be as efficiently used or leave the owner with a tax 
burden in trying to change the form of her small business. It is more difficult to 
pity the thousands of disparate shareholders of a corporate giant, who are 
probably diversified and may not even notice the last-gasp tax they will have to 
pay. However, in a small corporation, the backbone shareholders will surely 
notice. Again, the corporate form does not seem as separate from shareholders 
in the context of a small corporation as it does in the context of a giant like Wal-
Mart. Of course, immediately following repeal of General Utilities, there was a 
marked increase in small businesses formed and re-formed as pass-through 
entities because of the built-in tax advantages and the ease with which assets 
can move in and out of those forms.145 The C-corporation is now the province of 
only the largest operations and a few others who have other tax strategies.146 
Aside from repeal’s apparent mistreatment of small business owners, it 
created new problems in the market for corporate control.147 Even though 
General Utilities repeal had ushered in a new era of tax neutrality with respect 
 
 138.  Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 174.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 175–76. 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  See id. (explaining the classic case of the “family business” when the business splits up because 
of family pressures, related or unrelated to the operation of the business).  
 143.  Id. One cannot imagine Wal-Mart distributing all its assets to shareholders and then trying to 
operate as a pass-through entity such as a partnership.  
 144.  Beck, supra note 10, at 673. 
 145.  WOOD, supra note 13, at 8. 
 146.  Other tax issues may include avoiding the alternative minimum tax, another historical tax 
contraption, or those who simply pay themselves salaries as managers rather than distributing dividends 
to themselves as owners.  
 147.  See generally Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087 (questioning whether repeal was wise).  
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to acquisitions, it brought with it a troubling mismatch in corporate control.148 
Whereas prior to General Utilities repeal there had been an incentive to take 
over companies and operate their assets more efficiently, there was now an 
incentive to allow underutilized assets to sit on the books of unnecessarily 
bloated companies.149 Whatever victory may be claimed from slowing down 
merger activity following repeal of General Utilities,150 there was now another 
problem: stagnation. With new taxes complicating the free flow of assets in and 
out of various corporate forms, firms had a tendency to hold onto entire 
businesses that would not be as efficient under their control as they would be 
under someone else’s.151 Even if repeal was the right decision at the time, there 
are strong arguments for reviving, at the very least, some of the policy 
underlying General Utilities. 
B. Did Repeal Achieve Any of its Goals? 
The proponents of double taxation pretty clearly achieved their goal of 
broadening the scope of double taxation. General Utilities met its end and 
almost all gains and losses on distributed assets, with few exceptions, were now 
considered reportable events. Whether the policy underlying double taxation of 
corporate income is proper or not, the repeal of General Utilities certainly 
reiterated the preference among many for a double-tax regime. To be sure, the 
reformers had achieved their goal of reducing the arbitrariness of the tax 
treatment of corporate distributions.152 Once again, all were taxed. 
There is little evidence that the practical goal of some scholars of reducing 
merger activity was ever realized.153 Although merger activity slowed slightly in 
1986and 1987 following the repeal of General Utilities, it increased to heights 
above pre-repeal levels in 1988 and 1989.154 In addition to the little evidence that 
supports the theory that repeal slowed down or stopped inefficient merger 
activity, there is some evidence that it might have prevented some efficient 
merger activity.155 According to one commentator, the question never should 
have been whether the total takeover activity was too great, but rather whether 
the amount of inefficient takeovers were too great.156 Only after that question is 
addressed can policy be properly developed to limit the inefficient transactions 
while not inhibiting efficient ones. 
 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  See id. at 1097 (explaining that acquisitions are a natural way to punish corporate managers by 
taking assets away from those who are not efficiently utilizing them).  
 150.  See part IV.B for discussion on how General Utilities may not have slowed down merger 
activity.  
 151.  Kahng, supra note 4, at 1097. 
 152.  Shores, supra note 12, at 195.  
 153.  Id. at 181.  
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Kahng, supra note 4, at 1110. 
 156.  See id. at 1116 (criticizing lawmakers for recognizing only the undesirable aspect of takeover 
activity).  
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V 
GENERAL UTILITIES AS A TURNING POINT IN TAX LAW HISTORY 
Repeal of General Utilities was considered one of the “sea changes” in the 
life of many tax practitioners who practiced in the 1980s.157 Before General 
Utilities, the landscape of corporate liquidations and the natural flow of assets 
that went along with them were vastly different. Under the single, shareholder 
tax regime that existed under the codified General Utilities doctrine, assets 
could move in and out of the corporate form with relative ease, at least from a 
tax perspective.158 Shareholders of liquidating corporations were only subject to 
tax on capital gains once, rather than having to pick up the tab for the dead 
corporation as well. The law recognized the wisdom of nonrecognition in the 
context of a company’s liquidation. Of course, repeal simplified the Code and 
broadened the base of corporate taxation.159 It also further entrenched the 
concept of double taxation. 
Another notable effect of General Utilities repeal was a mass migration from 
subchapter-C to subchapter-S corporations. Since assets moving from 
subchapter-C or subchapter-S and back faced potential tax liability under a tax 
code without General Utilities, many smaller businesses that might have 
incorporated under Subchapter C opted instead to be an LLC or LLP. These 
provisions of the Code probably mitigated some of the harshness of General 
Utilities repeal. 
The shift underlying General Utilities was more than just a change in the way 
businesses do business. Despite the evidence of problems that arose from repeal 
and the thin justification for the double tax, repeal of General Utilities was an 
ebb away from a more integrated regime for corporate taxation. In truth, the 
fight over General Utilities was not so much about economic theory, business 
decisionmaking, or generating revenue. It was an ideological choice for double 
taxation. Many believe that even in the context of liquidation, an extraordinary 
event in the life cycle of a corporation, double taxation is still appropriate.160  
The policy underlying this reprieve from double taxation was based simply on 
the belief that double taxation itself was a bad idea as much as it was a bad idea 
in the liquidation context. Even today, the policy of double taxation is still up 
for debate.161 Today, like in the early 1980s, tax reform is once again a real 
possibility.162 And, again, broadening the tax base, that is, taxing more entities, is 
one competing goal.163 On the other hand, limiting the effects of double taxation 
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on taxpayers is, as it has always been, a potential driver of new tax policy.164 
Indeed, the last major tax-reform event, the Bush Tax Cuts, involved mitigating 
the effect of double taxation of corporate income through lowering rates on 
capital gains and dividends.165 Whether for the sake of efficiency, fairness to the 
consumer–investor, administrative simplicity, or even perhaps to encourage 
repatriation of American tax dollars from cross-border tax havens, some of the 
policy arguments regarding double taxation that underpinned General Utilities’ 
repeal could be considered by policymakers as they navigate the next potential 
shift in the history of American income taxation. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Tax policy, tax scholarship, tax theory, and tax practice all had different 
ways of analyzing the issue of corporate distributions and sales of appreciated 
assets. Over time, different value judgments over the efficacy of the double tax, 
the desirability of various tax avoidance opportunities, and politicians’ affinity 
for modifying taxpayer behavior through the Tax Code gave us a massive code 
filled with all sorts of divergent provisions. The story of the General Utilities 
doctrine is certainly no exception. It is not just a case of how to treat various 
types of business activities under the tax law, but perhaps a microcosm for how 
tax policy and philosophy ebb and flow over time. Beginning with the early 
regulations from the Treasury to the ultimate repeal of the doctrine in 1986, the 
life and death of General Utilities may be a microcosm for how scholarship, 
politics, and business approach tax issues differently. Will the future hold a 
return of General Utilities?  Though this answer is doubtful, it is abundantly 
clear that the General Utilities doctrine, and the tensions it represents, was a 
major part of the history of federal income taxation in the United States. 
 
 
themes and tones in tax policy).  
 164.  See Polito, supra note 95, at 6.  
 165.  Id. 
